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Recent work on neoliberalism has sought to reconcile a Marxist understanding of 
hegemony with poststructuralist ideas of discourse and governmentality derived from 
Foucault. This paper argues that this convergence cannot resolve the limitations of 
Marxist theories of contemporary socio-economic change, and nor do they do justice 
to the degree to which Foucault’s work might be thought of as a supplement to liberal 
political thought. The turn to Foucault highlights the difficulty that theories of 
hegemony have in accounting for the suturing together of top-down programmes with 
the activities of everyday life. However, the prevalent interpretation of 
governmentality only compounds this problem, by supposing that the implied subject-
effects of programmes of rule are either automatically realised, or more or less 
successfully ‘contested’ and ‘resisted’. Theories of hegemony and of governmentality 
both assume that subject-formation works through a circular process of recognition 
and subjection. Both approaches therefore treat ‘the social’ as a residual effect of 
hegemonic projects and/or governmental rationalities. This means that neither 
approach can acknowledge the proactive role that long-term rhythms of socio-cultural 
change can play in reshaping formal practices of politics, policy, and administration. 
The instrumental use of notions of governmentality to sustain theories of 
neoliberalism and neoliberalization supports a two-dimensional understanding of 
political power – which is understood in terms of relations of imposition and 
resistance – and of geographical space – which is understood in terms of the diffusion 
and contingent combination of hegemonic projects. Theories of neoliberalism provide 
a consoling image of how the world works, and in their simplistic reiteration of the 
idea that liberalism privileges the market and individual self-interest, they provide 
little assistance in thinking about how best to balance equally compelling imperatives 
to respect pluralistic difference and enable effective collective action. 
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‘“Liberalism” means different things to different people. The term is currently used in 
Europe by the Left to castigate the Right for blind faith in the value of an unfettered 
market economy and insufficient attention to the importance of state action in 
realizing the values of equality and social justice. […] In the United States, on the 
other hand, the term is used by the Right to castigate the Left for unrealistic 
attachment to the values of social and economic equality and the too ready use of 
government power to pursue those ends at the cost of individual freedom and 
initiative. Thus American Republicans who condemn the Democrats as bleeding-heart 
liberals are precisely the sort of people who are condemned as heartless neoliberals by 
French Socialists.” (Thomas Nagel 2002, 87). 
 
1). Irreconcilable differences? 
Judging by recent conference papers, journal articles, and the like, it seems that a 
reconciliation of a political-economy analysis of “neoliberalism” with a 
poststructuralist analysis of “advanced liberalism” is well under way. Commenting on 
this trend, Wendy Larner (2003) suggests that poststructuralist accounts that draw 
upon Foucault’s scattered ruminations on governmentality can usefully supplement 
the prevalent Marxist analysis of neoliberalism and neoliberalization. The 
Foucauldian approach is recommended because it is more attuned to the contingency 
and unanticipated consequences of neoliberal agendas. However, at the risk of re-
opening a set of debates that may or may not be “hackneyed”, I want to suggest that 
the Marxist and Foucauldian approaches are not necessarily as easily reconciled as it 
might seem. They imply different models of the nature of explanatory concepts; 
different models of causality and determination; different models of social relations 
and agency; and different normative understandings of political power. We should not 
finesse these differences away by presuming that the two approaches converge around 
a common real-world referent, so-called “neoliberalism”.  
By consolidating the taken-for-granted reference to “neoliberalism”, this 
convergence between Marxist and Foucauldian approaches installs a narrative that is 
even more disabling than stories about “globalization”. The common usage of 
“neoliberalism” as a descriptive concept and of “neoliberalization” as an explanatory 
concept reproduces a narrative in which recent history is understood in terms of a 
motivated shift away from public-collective values to private-individualistic values. 
Stories about “neoliberalism” thereby succeed only in finessing a set of interminable 
conflicts between equally compelling values of individualism and collectivism, 
autonomy and responsibility, freedom and obligation. They do so by aligning 
themselves with a one-sided picture of what liberalism is concerned with. Liberalism 
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has its roots in the affirmation of the moral sovereignty of the individual, expressed in 
the principle of equality. Historically, liberalism’s commitment to equality as a 
political principle generates a tendency to use the power of the state to extend equality 
and oppose inequality. Herein lies the source of the apparent incongruity noted by 
Nagel above, whereby liberalism names both the defence of liberty against undue 
state intervention as the opposite doctrine, according to which state power should be 
deployed to ensure the conditions of equal liberty. This incongruity in meaning points 
to a set of conflicts of value which are not easily resolvable, unless one is happy to 
accept the idea that any and all political conflict is really an expression of the 
seamless unfolding of the latent contradictions of capitalism. Liberalism is one 
tradition of thought, amongst others, that is concerned with elucidating the conditions 
for living peaceably with interminable conflicts of value, guided by the hope of 
progress but without the fantasy of transcendence. It seems entirely plausible to 
suppose that some of Foucault’s later writings might throw new light upon the 
established dilemmas of liberal thought. But whatever potential Foucault’s ideas 
might have in this respect is likely to be annulled if those ideas are instrumentalised 
for the purposes of shoring up the holes in Marxist narratives of “neoliberalism”. 
 
2). A marriage of convenience 
The prevalent conceptualization of “neoliberalism” is indebted to Gramscian state 
theory, inflected by a heavy dose of French regulation theory. “Neoliberalism”, from 
this perspective, is basically a new variant of a class-driven project of state 
restructuring in the interests of free-markets and expanded accumulation. 
Accordingly, “neoliberalism” is supposed to refer to a programme of policies and 
governance arrangements that favour privatization, the liberalization of markets, and 
more competition. Understood in this way, “neoliberalism” is presented as a coherent 
ideological project with clear and unambiguous origins, whose spread is sustained and 
circulated by an identifiable set of institutions. The basic analytical claim is that 
“neoliberalism” is a “hegemonic” project. This refers to two related propositions: 
firstly, that political dominance is exercised by the formation of coalitions amongst 
different interests; and secondly, that the primary medium for suturing together such 
formations is a set of coherent ideas and images about the world. This second aspect 
of theories of “neoliberal hegemony” in turn has a double aspect. Hegemonic ideas 
are supposed to tie together different elite actors within a ruling bloc; but they are also 
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supposed to do the rather more ordinary ideological work of legitimizing the political 
subordination of whole populations. The notion that “neoliberalism” amounts to a 
clearly defined, purposive project pursued by specifiable interest groups, which aims 
to subordinate public values to those of the market, conveniently resolves the 
analytical problem of the relationship between politics and economy. It does so by 
presenting “neoliberalism” as a “hegemonic” project “in which capital's logic is 
vocalized as a political programme and directive ideology. We don't have to worry 
about how to think about 'relative autonomy' since we (apparently) live in a period 
when politics and economic interest are directly fused” (Clarke 2004a, 4).  
The political economy conceptualization of “hegemony” is related to a particular 
framing of the geographies of “neoliberalism”. On the one hand, it supports the idea 
that “neoliberalism” diffuses downwards and outwards from a coherent set of 
institutional sites located in the United States and Europe. On the other hand, this 
means that academics can reassure themselves as to their sensitivity to difference and 
contingency by insisting that “neoliberalism” arrives differently in different places, 
combining with other processes to produce distinctive manifestations of what, 
nevertheless, remain varieties of a single genus. The recent turn to Foucault amongst 
theorists of neoliberalism fits well with this geographical framing of the centres and 
peripheries, the necessary properties and contingent realizations, of “neoliberal 
hegemony”. Foucault is invoked in two ways. Firstly, in the diffusionistic narrative of 
neoliberalism-as-hegemony, extensive use is made of the idea that “neoliberalism” 
can be understood as a “discourse”, where this is understood to refer to the 
institutionally located and regulative usage of ideas and concepts to shape pictures of 
reality. The concept of discourse is therefore understood instrumentally, as a synonym 
for ideology. It is used to refer to a set of imaginary-representative tools deployed by 
specific interest groups in pursuit of their interest in augmenting their own power.  
The attraction of the concept of hegemony is supposed to lie in its broadening out of 
the ways in which political domination is meant to operate – through consent as well 
as coercion. But the recurrent feature of the political-economy invocation of 
hegemony is that it lacks any clear sense of how consent is actually secured, or any 
convincing account of how hegemonic projects are anchored at the level of everyday 
life, other than implying that this works by “getting at” people in some way or other. 
And this is where the second use of Foucault in theories of neoliberalism-as-
hegemony comes to the fore. Extending the range of activities that are commodified, 
Consolations of ‘Neoliberalism’ 
 6 
commercialized and marketized necessarily implies that subjectivities have to be re-
fitted as active consumers, entrepreneurial subjects, participants, and so on. 
Accordingly, the notion of “governmentality” is appealed to in order to explain how 
broad macro-structural shifts from state regulation to market regulation are modulated 
with the micro-contexts of everyday routines.  
In the emerging paradigm which sees “neoliberalism” through the lens of Foucault’s 
ideas on governmentality, there is a repeated tendency to interpret governmentality as 
a distinctive modality of state action. On this reading, governmentality refers to a 
mutation of state-power that allows for the more precise and incipient regulation of 
conduct at a very detailed level at the same time as extending the reach of state power 
over large territorial scales. The literature on governmentality provides theorists of 
neoliberalism with a set of concepts – such as “apparatuses”, “technologies”, and 
“assemblages” – that are understood to be the instrumental mechanisms by which 
clearly defined actors, possessed with clearly articulated interests, pursue their clearly 
articulated programmes. Unfortunately, Foucault’s ideas on governmentality, as 
systematized by writers like Nikolas Rose, can’t actually do the work that they are 
called upon to do by theorists of “neoliberalism”. This is because when it comes to 
defining how top-down initiatives are articulated to everyday routines, theories of 
governmentality have exactly the same problem as theories of neoliberalism-as-
hegemony. This problem is completely elided in Foucault’s influential work on 
discipline, wherein detailed and bounded spatio-temporal routines automatically 
inscribe precise subject-effects. In contrast, the attraction of notions such as  
governmentality and biopolitics is that they address a different scale of activities – 
that of whole networks of institutions, bureaucracies, and states. But there is still a 
persistent tendency to assume that governmentality simply refers to the extension of a 
disciplinary mode of power over larger spatial scales under the auspices of the 
territorialized state. The trade-off between the scope and intensity of forms of rule that 
is implied by the idea of governing-at-a-distance is therefore ignored (see Barnett 
2001, Allen 2003). In this elision of discipline and governmentality, Foucault’s 
authority is invoked to refine a story that continues to present the reproduction of 
power-relations as a matter of social control.  
The variable relationship between the scope and intensity of rule should open up a 
set of questions about various middle ranges of agency. However, an entire paradigm 
of poststructuralist theory is unable to address these because it remains in thrall to an 
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account of subject-formation that privileges mechanisms of recognition and 
subjection. In this respect, the turn to Foucault amongst theorists of “neoliberalism” 
recalls the repressed memory of the strengths and weaknesses of the Althusserian 
concept of Ideological State Apparatuses. The new favoured vocabulary of 
“enrolment” and “enlistment” echoes Althusser’s attempt to combine the dual sense of 
self-formation as a process of being both a subject-of and subject-to. Indeed, one can 
even blend the vocabulary of governmentality with that of actor-networks and 
performativity in order to provide seemingly compelling accounts of the ways in 
which, for example, new styles of management knowledge magically “interpellate” 
and “hail” new subjects into existence (Thrift 2001). The recourse to this vocabulary 
of hailing and interpellation alongside that of enrolment and enlistment marks the 
point at which the problem of defining the precise relationship between an open-
ended sense of the enactment of power-relations and a sense of power as direction is 
closed down without any specification of the causal mechanisms through which these 
articulations are sustained.  
 
3). There is no such thing as neoliberalism! 
The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism – whether neo-Marxist and Foucauldian – 
comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives ‘take’ in everyday 
situations. So perhaps the best thing to do is to stop thinking of “neoliberalism” as a 
coherent “hegemonic” project altogether. For all its apparent critical force, the 
vocabulary of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” in fact provides a double 
consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for 
unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of 
revelation; and in so doing, it invites them to unproblematically align their own 
professional roles with the activities of various actors “out there”, who are always 
framed as engaging in resistance or contestation. The conceptualization of 
“neoliberalism” as a “hegemonic” project does not need refining by adding a splash of 
Foucault. Perhaps we should try to do without the concept of “neoliberalism” 
altogether, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring 
out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an 
overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of 
governmentality, stories about “neoliberalism” manage to squeeze out any thicker 
sense of social relations as anything other than a residual effect of hegemonic projects 
Consolations of ‘Neoliberalism’ 
 8 
and/or governmental programmes of rule (see Clarke 2004a). Stories about 
“neoliberalism” pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in 
provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. Consider the 
example of the restructuring of public services such as health care, education, and 
criminal justice in the UK over the last two or three decades. This can easily be 
thought of in terms of a “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”, and certainly one 
dimension of this process has been a form of anti-statism that has rhetorically 
contrasted market provision against the rigidities of the state. But in fact these 
ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of 
different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, 
politics, and culture.  These factors include changing consumer expectations, 
involving shifts in expectations towards public entitlements which follow from the 
generalization of consumerism; the decline of deference, involving shifts in 
conventions and hierarchies of taste, trust, access, and expertise; and the refusals of 
the subordinated, referring to the emergence of anti-paternalist attitudes found in, for 
example, women’s health movements or anti-psychiatry movements. They include 
also the development of the politics of difference, involving the emergence of 
discourses of institutional discrimination based on gender, sexuality, race, and 
disability. This has disrupted the ways in which welfare agencies think about 
inequality, helping to generate the emergence of contested inequalities, in which 
policies aimed at addressing inequalities of class and income develop an ever more 
expansive dynamic of expectation that public services should address other kinds of 
inequality as well (see Clarke 2004b).  
None of these populist tendencies is simply an expression of a singular 
“hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”. They are effects of much longer rhythms 
of socio-cultural change that emanate from the bottom-up. It seems just as plausible to 
suppose that what we have come to recognise as “hegemonic neoliberalism” is a 
muddled set of ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations to these unstable dynamics of 
social change as it is to think of it as the outcome of highly coherent political-
ideological projects. Processes of privatization, market liberalization, and de-
regulation have often followed an ironic pattern in so far as they have been triggered 
by citizens’ movements arguing from the left of the political spectrum against the 
rigidities of statist forms of social policy and welfare provision in the name of greater 
autonomy, equality, and participation (e.g. Horwitz 1989). The political re-alignments 
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of the last three or four decades cannot therefore be adequately understood in terms of 
a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values 
of individualism, or as a re-imposition of class power. The emergence and 
generalization of this populist ethos has much longer, deeper, and wider roots than 
those ascribed to “hegemonic neoliberalism”. And it also points towards the extent to 
which easily the most widely resonant political rationality in the world today is not 
right-wing market liberalism at all, but is, rather, the polyvalent discourse of 
“democracy” (see Barnett and Low 2004).  
Recent theories of “neoliberalism” have retreated from the appreciation of the long-
term rhythms of socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his 
influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian populism. Instead, they 
favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the like. 
One consequence of the residualization of the social is that theories of “neoliberalism” 
have great difficulty accounting for, or indeed even in recognizing, new forms of 
“individualized collective-action” (Marchetti 2003) that have emerged in tandem with 
the apparent ascendancy of “neoliberal hegemony”: environmental politics and the 
politics of sustainability; new forms of consumer activism oriented by an ethics of 
assistance and global solidarity; the identity politics of sexuality related to demands 
for changes in modes of health care provision, and so on (see Norris 2002). All of 
these might be thought of as variants of what we might want to call bottom-up 
governmentality. This refers to the notion that non-state and non-corporate actors are 
also engaged in trying to govern various fields of activity, both by acting on the 
conduct and contexts of ordinary everyday life, but also by acting on the conduct of 
state and corporate actors as well. Rose (1999, 281-284) hints at the outlines of such 
an analysis, at the very end of his paradigmatic account of governmentality, but 
investigation of this phenomenon is poorly developed at present. Instead, the trouble-
free amalgamation of Foucault’s ideas into the Marxist narrative of “neoliberalism” 
sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and 
the spirits of subversion (see Sedgwick 2003, 11-12). And clinging to this image only 
makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political 
action that does not conform to a romanticized picture of rebellion, contestation, or 
protest against domination (see Touraine 2001).  
Theories of “neoliberalism” are unable to recognize the emergence of new and 
innovative forms of individualized collective action because their critical imagination 
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turns on a simple evaluative opposition between individualism and collectivism, the 
private and the public. The radical academic discourse of “neoliberalism” frames the 
relationship between collective action and individualism simplistically as an 
opposition between the good and the bad. In confirming a narrow account of 
liberalism, understood primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and 
individual choice, there is a peculiar convergence between the radical academic left 
and the right-wing interpretation of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian 
conservatism. By obliterating the political origins of modern liberalism – understood 
as answering the problem of how to live freely in societies divided by interminable 
conflicts of value, interest, and faith - the discourse of “neoliberalism” reiterates a 
longer problem for radical academic theory of being unable to account for its own 
normative priorities in a compelling way. And by denigrating the value of 
individualism as just an ideological ploy by the right, the pejorative vocabulary of 
“neoliberalism” invites us to take solace in an image of collective decision-making as 
a practically and normatively unproblematic practice.  
The recurrent problem for theories of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” is 
their two-dimensional view of both political power and of geographical space. They 
can only account for the relationship between top-down initiatives and bottom-up 
developments by recourse to the language of centres, peripheries, diffusion, and 
contingent realizations; and by displacing the conceptualisation of social relations 
with a flurry of implied subject-effects. The turn to an overly systematized theory of 
governmentality, derived from Foucault, only compounds the theoretical limitations 
of economistic conceptualisations of “neoliberalism”. The task for social theory today 
remains a quite classical one, namely to try to specify “the recurrent causal processes 
that govern the intersections between abstract, centrally promoted plans and social life 
on the small scale” (Tilly 2000, 345). Neither neoliberalism-as-hegemony nor 
neoliberalism-as-governmentality is really able to help in this task, not least because 
both invest in a deeply embedded picture of subject-formation as a process of 
“getting-at” ordinary people in order to make them believe in things against their best 
interests. With respect to the problem of accounting for how “hegemonic” projects of 
“neoliberalism” win wider consensual legitimacy, Foucault’s ideas on 
governmentality seem to promise an account of how people come to acquire what 
Duncan Ivison (1997) calls the “freedom to be formed and normed”. Over time, 
Foucault’s own work moved steadily away from an emphasis on the forming-and-
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norming end of this formulation towards an emphasis on the freedom end. This shift 
was itself a reflection of the realization that the circularities of poststructuralist 
theories of subjectivity can only be broken by developing an account of the active 
receptivity of people to being directed. But, in the last instance, neither the story of 
neoliberalism-as-hegemony or of neoliberalism-as-governmentality can account for 
the forms of receptivity, pro-activity, and generativity that might help to explain how 
the rhythms of the everyday are able to produce effects on macro-scale processes, and 
vice versa. So, rather than finding convenient synergies between what are already 
closely related theoretical traditions, perhaps it is better to keep open those tiresome 
debates about the degree of coherence between them, at the same time as trying to 
broaden the horizons of our theoretical curiosity a little more widely.       
 
Notes 
Thanks to Michael Samers, Dave Land, and Jessica Pykett for thoughtful criticisms of 
earlier versions of the argument presented here.   
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